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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO. 43667 
      ) 
v.      ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2014-5888 
      ) 
KENNETH S. DICK,   )  
      ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF 
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
________________________________ ) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Kenneth S. Dick appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion pursuant to 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) for a reduction of sentence.  He contends the district 
court abused its discretion when it denied this motion because, at sentencing, the court 
placed great weight on the fact that Mr. Dick had been arrested prior to sentencing, but 
was not fully aware of, and thus did not adequately consider, the circumstances of his 
arrest.    
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 Mr. Dick and his fiancée were involved in an altercation early in the morning on 
April 26, 2014.  (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”), pp.3-5.)  Mr. Dick’s fiancée 
called the police, and the police responded to their residence.  (PSI, pp.3-4.)  Mr. Dick 
was not present at the time, but was arrested after his vehicle was stopped nearby, and 
his breath alcohol content was measured at .153 and .143.  (PSI, pp.3-4.)  Mr. Dick was 
charged by Information with attempted strangulation, domestic violence, unlawful 
possession of a firearm, and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol (DUI).  (R., pp.60-62.)   
 Mr. Dick entered into an agreement with the State pursuant to which he agreed 
to plead guilty to domestic violence and the State agreed to dismiss the other charges 
and recommend a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, with the district 
court retaining jurisdiction.  (R., p.66.)  The district court accepted Mr. Dick’s guilty plea.  
(R., p.66.)  Prior to sentencing, on October 26, 2014, Mr. Dick was arrested by the 
Parma Police Department for DUI, domestic violence, and violation of a “no contact” 
order.  (PSI, pp.11, 112-13; Tr., p.6, Ls.18-23.)  Mr. Dick allegedly drove over 30 miles 
to the house where his prior fiancée was staying, struck her, and then drove under the 
influence after leaving the residence.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.3-10.)  As a result of Mr. Dick’s 
arrest, the State determined it was released from its agreement to recommend a 
particular sentence.  (Tr., p.7, Ls.4-7.)   
 At sentencing, the State recommended a unified term of ten years, with three 
years fixed, and without a period of retained jurisdiction.  (Tr., p.16, Ls.9-11.)  Counsel 
for Mr. Dick concurred with the State’s recommendation of ten years, with three years 
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fixed, but recommended that the district court retain jurisdiction.  (Tr., p.22, L.22 – 
p.23, L.1.)  The district court sentenced Mr. Dick to a unified term of ten years, with four 
years fixed, and did not retain jurisdiction.  (R., p.66, 71; Tr., p.28, Ls.17-24.)  The 
district court imposed this sentence largely because of Mr. Dick’s arrest on October 26, 
2014.  The district court said: 
I agree with [Mr. Dick’s counsel] that these are only accusations at this 
point.  However, a very thorough investigation was done by the police, 
according to the reports that are contained here.  And, certainly, the 
defendant did violate the law; the extent of those violations are the same 
type of behavior that got him in trouble in the case that’s before me. 
 
(Tr., p.26, Ls.4-10.)   The judgment was entered on November 3, 2014.  (R. pp.70-73.) 
 On February 26, 2015, Mr. Dick filed a pro se Rule 35 motion requesting that the 
district court retain jurisdiction so that he could participate in a CAPP rider.  (R., pp.75-
84.)  The State filed an opposition to Mr. Dick’s motion.  (R., pp.104-05.)  On March 24, 
2015, the district court entered an order denying Mr. Dick’s Rule 35 motion.  
(R., pp.106-11.)  Mr. Dick delivered his pro se notice of appeal to jail officials for mailing 
on May 5, 2015, but it was not actually filed until October 27, 2015.  (R., pp.112-28.)  
This Court entered an order on November 9, 2015, conditionally dismissing this appeal.  
On January 13, 2016, this Court entered an order withdrawing the conditional dismissal. 
 
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Dick’s Rule 35 motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Dick’s Rule 35 Motion 
 
“A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to 
the sound discretion of the sentencing court . . . and essentially is a plea for leniency 
which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.”  
State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).  “The denial of a motion for 
modification of a sentence will not be disturbed absent a showing that the court abused 
its discretion.”  Id.   
The district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Dick’s Rule 35 motion 
because it did not exercise due caution when it considered, at sentencing, the facts of 
Mr. Dick’s arrest on October 26, 2014.  A district court can consider allegations of 
criminal conduct at sentencing, but it must exercise “due caution” in doing so.  See 
State v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 409, 411 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Paz, 112 Idaho 407, 409 
(Ct. App. 1987).  The district court was not aware of all of the circumstances 
surrounding Mr. Dick’s arrest on October 26, 2014, and did not exercise due caution 
when it considered that arrest.   
In support of his Rule 35 motion, Mr. Dick explained to the district court that, after 
he committed the offense at issue, the victim contacted him multiple times through text 
messages and phone calls.  (R., p.78.)  The victim also broke into Mr. Dick’s house on 
multiple occasions and stole items belonging to Mr. Dick.  (R., p.79.)  Indeed, on 
October 25, 2014, which was the day before Mr. Dick was arrested by the Parma Police 
Department, the victim broke into Mr. Dick’s house and stole his laptop computer and 
iPad.  (R., p.79.)  Mr. Dick accepted responsibility for the offense at issue, but argued to 
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the district court that it had sentenced him based largely on the October 26, 2014 arrest, 
without being fully aware of the circumstances surrounding that arrest.  Mr. Dick 
explained:     
I do not contest my guilt of the felony, nor do I want to minimize Emily 
McKnight as a victim by disclosing the events and facts previously 
mentioned.  Emily McKnight deserves justice from my actions on the night 
of April 25, 2014.  I am attempting to share the events that occurred during 
the 6 months preceding my sentencing on Oct. 30, 2014, so that I, too, 
can receive a fair sentence and justice. 
 
(R., p.80.) 
In its order denying Mr. Dick’s Rule 35 motion, the district court acknowledged 
that Mr. Dick had supported his motion with new information, but said that Mr. Dick’s 
allegations about the victim “are irrelevant to the fact that [he] horribly beat the victim 
before she allegedly did these bad acts, and immaterial to the sentence imposed.”  
(R., p.110.)  The district court’s explanation does not account for the fact it relied at 
sentencing in large part on the fact of Mr. Dick’s October 26, 2014 arrest, which was 
what resulted in the State’s recommendation that the district court not retain jurisdiction.  
In fact, the district court appeared to consider Mr. Dick’s October 26, 2014 arrest as 
almost a continuing pattern of conduct.  This was improper and is not supported by the 
circumstances leading up to the arrest.   
Where, as here, a district court sentences a defendant for an offense that is not 
before the court, and considers the existence of alleged criminal activity without due 
caution, the proper remedy is for this Court to vacate the sentence and remand for 
resentencing.  See, e.g., State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 229 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(vacating and remanding for resentencing where “the district court went beyond [its] 
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authority and essentially imposed sentence for offenses other than the one that was 
before the court”).   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Mr. Dick respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order 
denying his Rule 35 motion and remand this case to the district court with instructions to 
retain jurisdiction over Mr. Dick pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2601(4). 
 DATED this 20th day of April, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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